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Abstract 
Total debt in the People’s Republic of China surged to nearly 290% as a ratio to GDP by the second quarter of 2016, mostly on account of 
non-financial corporate debt. The outpouring of credit to stem the impact of the global financial crisis accentuated industrial overcapacity in 
traditional sectors, such as steel, cement, and energy, while feeding asset bubbles in the property, equity and bond markets.  At the 
Chinese corporate level, this has translated into weakened fundamentals and a fall in industrial profits, particularly of SOEs. As debtors 
struggle to service interest payments, non-performing loans (NPLs) have been on the rise. This paper assesses the financial fragility of the 
Chinese economy by looking at risk factors in the non-financial sector. We apply quantile regressions to a dataset containing all Chinese 
listed companies in Standard & Poor’s IQ Capital database. We find higher sensitivity over time of corporate leverage to some of its key 
determinants, particularly for firms at the upper margin of the distribution. In particular, profitability increasingly acts as a curb on corporate 
leverage. At a time of falling profitability across the Chinese non-financial corporate sector, this eases the brake on leverage and may 
contribute to its continuing increase. 
Keywords: Corporate Debt, People’s Republic of China, debt Sustainability, Panel Quantile Regression. 
JEL Classification Code: H30, G21, G01, H60. 
1. Introduction1
Corporate leverage in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) accelerated in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, accentuating industrial overcapacity in traditional 
sectors and fueling asset bubbles in the property, stock and 
bond markets. Earnings and financial performance of 
companies have deteriorated, and with them the asset 
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quality of the Chinese financial sector holding the bulk of the 
corporate debt. Warnings about the dangers of excessive 
corporate leverage and financial sector vulnerability have 
been a staple of the international press since at least 2015, 
and also the Chinese authorities have recognized the 
problem. 
Much of the debate on debt and financial sustainability in 
the PRC has centered on aggregate data and indicators, 
which suggest a marked rise in corporate debt and non-
performing loans held by the domestic banking system. 
However, a macro focus tends to overlook heterogeneity 
and vulnerabilities at the micro level, which are relevant to 
policy formulation (Bernanke & Campbell, 1988). For 
example, recent market analysis associates the energy 
sector with the lowest return on capital and the largest 
increase in non-performing loan ratios among Chinese 
industries, suggesting that it should be a prime focus of 
authorities’ monitoring efforts (S&P Global Market 
Intelligence, 2016).  
Additional and more systematic insights can be gained 
from regression analysis of corporate balance sheet data. 
Early attempts, pre-dating the recent credit surge, can be 
found in the literature assessing the determinants of capital 
structure in the PRC (e.g. Chen, 2004, Huang & Song, 
2006). It shows that the insights from modern finance theory 
of capital structure are borne out in the Chinese corporate 
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data, notwithstanding institutional differences compared to 
the US and European markets and the presence of financial 
constraints in the Chinese banking sector.2
This paper builds on this strain of literature to determine 
the drivers of non-financial corporate debt in the PRC during 
the credit surge since 2009. Focus is on the margins of the 
corporate distribution and on variations in the determinants 
of corporate leverage that could signal rising risk of financial 
distress particularly in these segments of the Chinese 
corporate landscape. This is accomplished through the use 
of panel and simultaneous quantile analysis, beyond the 
mean-based OLS regression analysis of previous 
approaches. The empirical investigation relies on Standard 
& Poor’s IQ Capital database, which contains richly detailed 
historical balance sheet data and key financial indicators of 
Chinese companies up until 2015. The data and sources are 
summarized in Appendix.
We find that, over time, corporate leverage has become 
more sensitive to changes in some of its key determinants, 
particularly for firms at the upper margin of the distribution. 
In particular, profitability appears to have increased over 
time its impact as a curb on corporate leverage. Among the 
underlying reasons is the government-induced massive 
stimulus to stem the global financial crisis, which caused a 
significant decline in lending rates and incentivizes 
companies to borrow instead of relying on retained earnings 
as a source of funding.  This eases the brake on leverage 
at a time when corporate profitability is falling, and likely 
contributes to further rises of corporate debt.   
The paper is structured to provide a brief overview of 
rising leverage and financial risk in the PRC’s corporate 
sector, in Section 2. This is followed, in Section 3, by a 
presentation of the empirical framework and the data used, 
and a discussion of the results achieved. The paper closes 
with lessons for policy and broader conclusions, in Section 4.  
2. Corporate Leverage and Growing 
Financial Risk  
Stable at roughly 40% of GDP in 2015, general 
government debt in the PRC is not particularly large 
compared to other emerging economies.3 However, total 

2 In particular, the state exerts vast control over the state-owned 
enterprises and the financial system, which reduces the likelihood 
and costs of financial distress compared to those facing the 
private corporate sector (Chen 2004, Borst and Lardy 2015). 
3 Accounting for both explicit and contingent off-budget liabilities 
incurred by local governments through their financing platforms, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the PRC’s 
debt across all sectors ballooned to nearly 290% by the 
second quarter of 2016 (Figure 1). The massive build-up of 
debt—mostly domestic—accelerated from the end of 2008 
onward, when the government enacted unprecedented 
monetary and fiscal stimulus to stem the impact of the 
global financial crisis.4 Fiscal stimulus alone amounted to 
nearly CNY 6 trillion—or 18.5% of GDP—between 2008 and 
2010 (Ferrarini et al., 2012).  
Stimulus often was directed to the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) whose liabilities grew to 115% of GDP in 
2015, or funneled through the policy and state-controlled 
commercial banks. The net effect of intervention was a 
significant though discontinuous fall in the benchmark 
lending rate, from nearly 7.5% in January 2008 to 5.3% by 
2010 and 4.3% by the end of 2015 (Figure 2). The decline in 
the lending rate is likely to have altered the relative 
opportunity cost of the alternative funding sources for firms, 
and in particular between retained earnings and external 
debt.  
<Figure 1> PRC total debt (in percent of GDP) 

public debt ratio is substantially higher, at 56% in 2015, and will 
rise to nearly 74% of GDP by 2021. 
4 And grow it did: the PRC’s real GDP expanded on average by 
nearly 9.2% each year between 2009 and 2013, while the United 
States, Japan and the euro area were struggling with 0.3% 
growth on average (ADO 2011, 2013). 
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<Figure 2> PRC benchmark lending rate (%) 
The PRC’s credit to GDP gap—measuring banking risk 
and defined as the difference between the credit-to-GDP 
ratio and its long-term trend—reached 30.1 in the first 
quarter of 2016 (BIS, 2016). The Bank for International 
Settlements warns that this exceeds the gap of any other 
country it has been tracking, as well as that of the East 
Asian economies involved in the 1998 crisis and the United 
States’ prior to the Lehman crisis. Moreover, the PRC’s 
credit has expanded against the backdrop of a sharply 
slower economic growth in recent years, reflecting weaker 
external demand as well as authorities’ steering efforts 
toward a more balanced, sustainable growth model.  
The credit surge since 2009 worsened industrial 
overcapacity—hence profitability—in traditional sectors, 
such as steel, cement, and energy, while feeding asset 
bubbles in the property, equity and bond markets.  At the 
Chinese corporate level, this has translated into weakened 
fundamentals and a sharp fall in industrial profits, 
particularly of SOEs. As debtors struggle to service interest 
payments, non-performing loans (NPLs) have been on the 
rise. Chinese official figures show NPLs continuously rising 
during the past four years, to 1.8% of total loans in the first 
quarter of 2016. However, the PRC does not follow standard 
international practice in recording NPLs, which tend to be 
understated as a result. Most analysts estimate that the NPL 
ratio exceeds 15% of total loans outstanding (CLSA, 2016; 
Fitch Ratings, 2016). This ratio does not include bad debt in 
the country’s shadow banking system, which itself is 
estimated to have grown more than threefold between the 
end of 2012 and the first quarter of 2016, to about 10% of 
bank assets (S&P Global Ratings, 2016a). 
Data limitations notwithstanding, rising pressure in the 
Chinese corporate sector is best gauged at the firm level, as 
the share of total debt held by companies whose earnings 
(EBITDA) are insufficient to cover interest expenses. This 
ratio is seen spiking from 3.5% or less throughout the period 
from 1998 to 2011, to nearly 7% in 2012 and to more than 
14% in 2015 (Figure 3).5
<Figure 3> Non-financial corporate debt at risk 
Breaking down the non-financial corporate distribution, 
the ICR can be seen deteriorating across corporate layers 
delineated by its 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles 

5 Specifically, we derive this measure from the S&P Capital IQ 
database, described in Appendix. The S&P data extract accounts 
for all Chinese listed companies for the years between 1990 and 
2015. Isolating non-financial companies with accounting data 
available, we are able to identify a sample of expanding size over 
time, from 52 companies in 1998 to 3,377 in 2015. Companies’ 
interest coverage ratio (ICR) is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to 
interest expense. A company is considered to be at risk when 
EBITDA is insufficient to cover its interest expense in any given 
year, or ICR<1 (IMF 2016.) This threshold is arbitrary. Less 
conservative approaches have been to define at risk all debt 
owed by firms with ICR<2 (such as in IMF 2016). The US dollar 
amount of debt at risk in the Chinese non-financial corporate 
sector is then computed as the ratio of aggregate debt owed by 
companies with ICR<1 to total debt. 
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(Figure 4). Similarly, profitability has declined repeatedly 
between 2009 and 2015 at all five the quantiles (Figure 5). 
However, deterioration of these financial ratios is 
considerably stronger at the upper 95thquantile of Chinese 
non-financial corporate distribution, compared to the mean 
and lower quantiles, which suggests that regression 
analysis is to allow for heterogeneity in the PRC’s corporate 
landscape. 
<Figure 4> Non-financial sector ICR quantiles 
<Figure 5> Non-financial sector profitability 
As a result of growing financial pressures in vast 
segments of the non-financial corporate landscape, the 
Chinese banking system now holds an unprecedented pile 
of loans that constitutes a large contingent burden and is 
fueling concerns about the growing risks of a disruptive 
adjustment to the Chinese economy, with international 
repercussions (ADB, 2016; Moody’s, 2016). Based on 
current market reports, it is unclear to what extent the 
nation's banking system will be able to absorb weakening 
borrower credit quality without requiring a larger bail out 
operation by the state. Some evidence on banking sector 
performance can be evinced from the S&P data. We rank 
the top 50 banks according to their total asset holdings in 
2015, and group them into four policy and commercial bank 
categories.6
<Figure 6> Total Assets (group totals, USD billion) 

6 Following S&P Global Ratings (2016b), we divide banks into the 
following categories: 
(A) Top 5 commercial banks: the top five largest banks by far in 
terms of asset size and with the broadest branch network 
across the country; 
(B) National banks: large joint-stock commercial banks with a 
nationwide network; 
(C) Regional banks: smaller joint-stock commercial banks and the 
leading city or rural commercial banks; and 
(D) Policy banks: Agricultural Development Bank of China, China 
Development Bank Corporation, and The Export-Import Bank 
of China, which are used by the Chinese authorities to direct 
financing to certain economic sectors. 
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<Figure 7> Return on Assets (averages) 
<Figure 8> Total Capital Ratios (average percent) 
<Figure 9> Coverage ratio (group averages) 
Financial indicator charts along this breakdown provide 
evidence of incipient vulnerability in the banking sector. 
Total assets surged across the sector, although at a 
progressively slowing rate since about 2010 (Figure 6). The 
top five commercial banks hold the bulk of assets, but credit 
growth involved all segments of the banking sector, 
including the regional banks. However, growth in revenues 
and net income did not keep up with that of assets, causing 
returns on assets (ROA) to drop significantly in the three 
years to 2015 (Figure 7). In the meantime, the banking 
sector failed to raise capital at the same pace as it was 
issuing credits, causing capital ratios to shrink between 
2011 and 2014 (Figure 8). This is true in relation to average 
ratios for the 50 top banks taken together, not for the policy 
banks, which raised capital and saw their ratios increase 
over the same period. Lately, since 2015, the top 5 and 
other commercial banks have been raising capital in 
response to higher loan impairments. Nevertheless, the 
banking sector’s efforts have been insufficient so far to stem 
against the continuing fall since 2012 of the ratio of loan 
losses allowance to impaired loans (Figure 9). Averaging 
2.4 in 2015 across the top 50 banks, coverage appears to 
be adequate still, although the underestimation of impaired 
loans may grossly overstate this statistic. 
In sum, S&P company data provides evidence of rising 
leverage in the Chinese non-financial corporate sector 
against the backdrop of falling returns and interest coverage 
ratios. The impact of deteriorating asset quality does not yet 
seem fully reflected in banks’ balance sheets. However, 
weakening capital ratios since the 2009 credit surge and a 
sharp drop in returns on assets more recently appear to 
signal financial sector vulnerabilities, which are likely to 
sharpen against the trend of rising financial pressure in 
large segments of the PRC’s corporate sector.   
3. Determinants of Corporate Debt 
Focus turns now to the determinants of corporate 
leverage in the PRC. Heterogeneity across the non-financial 
corporate sector implies that an aggregate, mean-based 
approach would be ill suited to identifying vulnerabilities, 
particularly those affecting firms at the margins of the 
corporate distribution.  Our empirical approach thus entails 
quantile regression analysis, which we apply within the 
framework developed by the theoretical literature on 
corporate debt. This literature has identified a number of 
possible explanations for the capital structure of firms 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1991). According 
to models based on agency costs, firms choose their debt-
equity ratio with a view to mitigate the possible conflicts of 
interest between equity holders and managers, and 
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between equity holders and debt holders. An important 
implication of these theories is that firms with limited scope 
for asset substitution are likely to have higher debt levels, 
because they face lower agency costs of debt. Corporation 
tax rules could also act as an incentive to issue debt to 
reduce tax liabilities. In general, firms might trade off the 
increasing agency and bankruptcy costs associated with 
high debt with the tax benefits of increased leverage. 
An alternative explanation of capital structure is based on 
asymmetric information between investors and firm’s 
insiders. Managers may choose a high debt-equity ratio in 
order to signal the good financial health of the firm. A high 
leverage would credibly convey the signal that the firm faces 
a low risk of bankruptcy. Finally, the pecking order theory of 
financing argues that firms will seek to avoid the higher cost 
of external debt and the dilution of equity capital associated 
with new equity issue. Firms will finance new investment 
internally in the first instance; once internal sources of 
finance are exhausted they will issue low-risk debt, and only 
as a last resort will they choose to issue new equity. 
The empirical literature on corporate finance has identified 
a number of potential determinants of the capital structure 
choice. These determinants include profitability, size, growth 
opportunities, asset tangibility, non-debt tax shields, and 
volatility or business risk (see Titman & Wessels, 1988, 
Harris & Raviv, 1991). Profitability should have a negative 
effect on leverage according to the pecking order theory of 
capital structure. Bigger firms could face a lower risk of 
default than smaller firms because of the greater 
diversification of their investment. Furthermore, larger firms 
could have easier access to capital markets, and could 
borrow under better conditions than small firms. We would 
therefore expect a positive effect of firm size on debt. 
Growth opportunities can be seen as non-collateralizable 
assets: firms with sizeable growth opportunities may find it 
more difficult to borrow externally because of the asset 
substitution effect (Titman & Wessels, 1988). By contrast, a 
greater share of tangible assets should have an 
unambiguously positive effect on leverage because the 
assets can be used as collateral for loans. Non-debt tax 
shields, such as depreciation allowances, should have a 
negative influence on leverage because they reduce the 
incentive to issue external debt (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). 
Finally, volatility or business risk could be associated with 
the potential cost of financial distress, and should have a 
negative effect on leverage. 
In our empirical analysis, we examine the determinants of 
the debt-equity ratio of firms (LEV), the interest coverage 
ratio (ICR) defined as the ratio between EBITDA and 
interest expense, the debt-earnings ratio (DTE), and 
Altman’s Z-score (ZALT). The regression variables are 
computed from the S&P Capital IQ database and include 
Chinese company panel data from 2009 to 2015.7
3.1. Panel Fixed Effects 
Table 1 presents the results of estimating the model by 
panel fixed effects. 8  The first three columns report 
estimates for total leverage (LEV), defined as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets, and for both long-term leverage 
(LLEV) and short-term leverage (SLEV) where we consider 
long-term debt and short-term debt only respectively. 
Profitability has a negative and significant coefficient, which 
is consistent with the pecking order theory of capital 
structure. Size has a positive and significant coefficient for 
total leverage LEV and for long-term leverage LLEV only. 
Neither asset growth (GROWTA) nor earnings volatility 
(EVOL) is significant for any of the measures of leverage. 
Asset tangibility (TANG) is positive and significant for all 
definitions of leverage, consistent with both the agency 
theory and the pecking order theory. Finally, non-debt tax 
shields (NDTS)—calculated as the ratio of total depreciation 
to total assets—are statistically significant but are only 
negative for long-term leverage. That is, non-debt tax 
shields seem to shorten debt maturity. 
Our findings so far are broadly supportive of the agency 
and the pecking order theory of capital structure, and weakly 
also of the signaling theory, although they would not be able 
to discriminate conclusively between these alternative 
theories.

7 The database and variables are described and summarized in 
Appendix.
8 Hausman tests reject the random effects specification for all the 
estimated equations. 
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<Table 1> Capital Structure of non-financial firms, panel fixed effects   
Variable Total leverage
Long-term 
leverage
Short-term 
leverage
1/ Interest 
Coverage Ratio
Debt/Earnings 
Ratio 1/ Altman-Z score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LEV LLEV SLEV (ICR)-1 DTE (ZALT)-1 
Prof -0.208*** -0.092* -0.094* 
(lagged) prof -1.548*** -30.720*** 0.01
size 0.023*** 0.016*** -0.004 0.060** 1.558*** 
(lagged) size 0.104** 
growta 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(lagged) growta -0.001 
tang 0.210*** 0.083*** 0.096*** -0.13 4.222 
(lagged) tang 0.212 
evol 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(lagged) evol 0.003 0.071 0.001* 
ndts 0.545* -0.365* 0.686** 2.374* -42.104 
(lagged) ndts -4.042 
C 0.011 -0.041 0.116*** -0.009 -3.173 -0.199 
N 6881 6881 6881 6751 6751 6747 
Number of groups 983 983 983 983 983 983 
R-squared 0.186 0.21 0.029 0.053 0.085 0.007 
F-statistic 29.652 14.219 9.694 17.105 14.534 8.083 
Hausman  36.37***  43.94***  52.38***  64.41***  57.83***  14.48* 
 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are robust and allow for intergroup correlation. 
Regression variables are computed from S&P Capital IQ data, and include Chinese company data from 2009 to 2015. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 examine potential 
determinants of key indicators of financial fragility of firms. 
Column (4) reports the results of estimating the equation for 
the inverse of the interest coverage ratio (ICR)-1. Values of 
ICR less than one indicate that current earnings fall short of 
the interest expenses which are due, and therefore low 
values of ICR (or high values of its inverse (ICR)-1) are an 
indicator of financial distress. Profitability and earnings 
volatility have been lagged to avoid potential endogeneity 
with the dependent variable. The fixed-effects estimates 
show that lagged profitability has a negative effect and non-
debt tax shield a positive effect as expected. Size has a 
positive effect, which is consistent with its positive influence 
on leverage. 
Column (5) of Table 1 looks at the debt-earnings ratio 
(DTE) as the dependent variable. This ratio too is used as 
an indicator of the potential financial distress of companies. 
Profitability and earning volatility have again been lagged to 
avoid endogeneity. The only significant variables are 
profitability and size, with a negative and a positive 
coefficient, respectively, as expected. 
Finally, column (6) gives the results of estimating the 
determinants of the inverse Altman’s Z-score, (ZALT)-1. The 
Z-score is a weighted average of five ratios: (i) working 
capital / total assets; (ii) retained earnings / total assets; (iii)
earnings before interest and taxes / total assets; (iv) the 
market value of equity/ the book value of total liabilities; and 
(v) sales / total assets (Altman 1968). It is usually 
interpreted as a predictor of the probability that the company 
will go into bankruptcy within two years. High values of the 
inverse Z-score can thus be read as indicating low 
bankruptcy risk. All the regressors are lagged one period in 
the fixed effect regressions to avoid simultaneity bias. 
Among the statistically significant variables, size has a large 
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and positive coefficient, which indicates that size is 
associated with a lower probability of bankruptcy. Earnings 
volatility also has a positive and significant coefficient, but its 
effect is relatively modest in absolute value. 
3.2. Quantile Regression Panel Data 
The estimates in Table 1 allow for firm-specific, time-
invariant fixed effects ߙ௜  to capture the unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms in the response of the dependent 
variable to the conditioning variables. A potential 
shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes a common 
response of the dependent variable to the explanatory 
variables for all firms. This can be a strong assumption, 
since the response of the dependent variable could be 
different across the distribution of firms. For example, 
variables such as the size of the firm or the share of tangible 
assets could play a different role depending on whether the 
firm is already highly leveraged or not. In this case, a more 
suitable approach to estimating the response of the 
dependent variables to the conditioning variables across the 
whole distribution of firms is to estimate the model by 
quantile regression (Koenker & Basset, 1978). Quantile 
regression estimation allows for different values of the 
regression coefficients across the different quantiles of the 
distribution of firms, and is therefore able to capture non-
linearities in the response of the dependent variable to its 
determinants9.
Quantile regressions with fixed effects for panel data 
presents however the difficulty that quantile estimators with 
additive fixed effects may not have the same interpretation 
as cross-sectional regressions. The reason for this is that, 
using conventional notation, the distribution of ሺ ௜ܻ௧ െ ߙ௜ሻȁ ௜ܺ௧
is not order-isomorphic to the distribution of ௜ܻ௧ȁ ௜ܺ௧ : an 
observation which lies in one of the low quantiles of the 
distribution with respect to ௜ܻ௧  may lie in one of the top 
quantiles of the distribution with respect to ሺ ௜ܻ௧ െ ߙ௜ሻ, and 
vice versa. This creates difficulties for the interpretation of 
panel quantile regressions with additive fixed effects, since 
the results cannot be understood in the same manner as 
cross-sectional regressions. 
The estimator developed by Powell (2014) is able to 
address this concern, and to yield estimation results which 
can be interpreted in the same manner as cross-sectional 
regressions. The regression outcomes are modeled as: 

9  Fattouh et al. (2005, 2008) use quantile regression to study 
capital structure in the Republic of Korea and in the United 
Kingdom respectively. 
(1) ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ƍ ߚሺ ௜ܷ௧כ ሻ
where ௜ܷ௧כ ̱ܷሺͲǡͳሻ and where ௜ܺ௧ƍ ߚሺ߬ሻ is strictly increasing 
in ߬ א ሺͲǡͳሻ The outcomes in (1) can be compared with 
other quantile estimators by setting ௜ܷ௧כ ൌ ݂ሺߙ௜ǡ ௜ܷ௧ሻ . The 
causal effect of a change in the conditioning variable from 
ݔଵ to ݔଶ for a given W is:
(2) ݔଶƍ ߚሺ߬ሻ െ ݔଵƍ ߚሺ߬ሻ
where W denotes the quantile of the distribution. Using (2), 
we can define the structural quantile function (SQF) for 
equation (1) as: 
(3) ܵ௒ሺ߬ȁݔሻ ൌ ݔƍߚሺ߬ሻ
The identifying assumption for additive fixed effects 
models is the following: 
(4) ௜ܷ௧ȁሺ ௜ܺ௧ǡ ߙ௜ሻ̱ܷሺͲǡͳሻ
Powell’s (2014) Quantile Regression Panel Data (QRPD) 
estimator relaxes (4), and only requires the weaker 
identification assumption: 
(5) ௜ܷ௧כ ȁ ௜̱ܺ ௜ܷ௦כ ȁ ௜ܺ   t, s = 1, 2, …, T
The SQF for the additive fixed effect model is ߙ௜ െ ݔƍߚሺ߬ሻ,
whereas the SQF for the QRPD model is ݔƍߚሺ߬ሻ. As a result, 
the interpretation of the W-th quantile for the QRPD is the 
same as for the cross-sectional distribution (or equivalently 
for the pooled quantile regression). 
Benno Ferrarini , Marthe Hinojales, Pasquale Scaramozzino / Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business Vol 4 No1 (2017) 5-18        13 

<Table 2> Capital structure of non-financial firms, Quantile Regression Panel Data (QRPD)   
Total Leverage 1/ Interest Coverage Ratio 
Variable 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Variable 5th 25th 50th 75t 95t
prof -0.105 -0.241 -0.232 -0.283** -0.335 (lagged) prof -0.038 -0.179*** -0.641*** -0.904*** -0.043
size 0.162*** 6.189 0.057 0.023* 0.040 size 0.001 0.024*** 0.021 0.021 0.040 
growta 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 growta 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
tang 0.100 1.433 0.250 0.186*** 0.091 tang 0.008 0.016 0.038 0.021 -0.046
evol 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 (lagged) evol 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 8.185***
ndts 0.496 2.488 0.784 0.526 0.427 ndts 0.334 0.442* 0.116 -0.096 -0.448 
N 6881 N 6751  
No. of groups 983 No. of groups 983  
 
Long-term Leverage Debt/Earnings Ratio 
Variable 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Variable 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
prof 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.160 (lagged) prof -0.332 -6.904* -11.654*** -17.648*** -24.964***
size 0.247 0.012* 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.037 size 7.527*** 0.736 1.044*** 1.256 1.061
growta 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** growta -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 -0.005 
tang 0.002 0.037** 0.082*** 0.111** 0.177 tang 1.768 1.955* 2.368*** 2.532** 10.328 
evol -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 (lagged) evol 0.002 0.007 0.016 0.019 0.368
ndts 0.066 -0.057 -0.223 -0.251 -0.047 ndts -1.324 -9.140 -14.305 -24.029 -41.029
N 6881 N 6751 
No. of groups 983 No. of groups 983 
Short-term Leverage 1/ Altman-Z score 
Variable 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Variable 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
prof -0.028 -0.140 -0.108 -0.255** -0.343 (lagged)prof -0.210 -0.622*** -0.780*** -0.864*** -0.810 
size 0.229 5.029 0.035* -0.008 -0.008 (lagged)size 9.591 0.053*** 0.076 0.091*** 0.081 
growta 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 (lagged)growta 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 
tang 0.011 0.025 0.019 0.044 0.042 (lagged)tang 0.072 0.126*** 0.186*** 0.216** 0.273 
evol 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 (lagged)evol 0.010 0.000*** 0.000 0.001 0.156 
ndts 0.111 0.319 0.896 1.987*** 0.789 (lagged)ndts -0.010 0.222 0.151 0.753 3.379 
N 6881 N 6747  
No. of groups 983 No. of  groups 983  
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
Table 2 reports the results of quantile regression panel 
data estimation for our sample of non-financial companies. 
The findings reveal that the fixed-effects assumption of 
constant regression coefficients across the distribution of 
firms is not generally confirmed by the data. The estimated 
coefficients often vary across quantiles, although it is difficult 
to discern a clear pattern in the data across all the financial 
variables. Regarding capital structure, some of the strongest 
results are obtained for long-term leverage. Both size and 
the share of tangible assets are positive and statistically 
significant over the central quantiles of the distribution, with 
the first result consistent with the signaling theory of capital 
structure and the second with collateralizable assets 
ceasing to be relevant for firms with a very low or a very 
high leverage. 
Lagged profits exert a strong and significance influence 
on financial ratios. The estimated coefficients are negative 
and significant for the inverse of ICR and for DTE, and 
increase in size for the upper quantiles of the distribution: 
higher profits therefore reduce the financial fragility of firms. 
They however increase the overall risk of bankruptcy as 
measured by the Z-score, which may also be consistent with 
signaling theory. Size tends to be associated with high debt-
earnings ratios for firms in the left tail of the distribution and 
with lower Z-scores for firms in the central quantiles of the 
distribution. A higher share of tangible assets tends to be 
associated with larger debt-earnings ratios but with lower Z-
scores. 
The QRPD estimations illustrate that the assumption that 
regression coefficients are constant across the distributions 
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of firms may not be valid. The effects of the regressors on 
the debt-equity ratios or on financial ratios can be different 
in the middle ranges of the distributions of firms and on the 
tails. The findings from QRPD tend to be more supportive of 
signaling theories of capital structure than the fixed-effects 
estimates would suggest. 
3.3. Simultaneous Panel Quantile Regressions 
The Quantile Regression Panel Data approach of Section 
3.2 has the advantage of being directly comparable to 
cross-sectional quantile regression estimations in the 
interpretation of the regression coefficients, because of the 
weaker identifying assumption (5). Estimation by QRPD 
however still requires that the coefficients remain constant 
over time. DeAngelo and Roll (2015) found evidence that 
firm leverage exhibits significant variability over time. It is 
important therefore to investigate whether the responses of 
the dependent variables to their determinants vary along the 
economic cycle or over time. If this proves to be the case, 
then the assumption of constant coefficients would not be 
valid.
<Table 3> Capital structure of non-financial corporations: simultaneous panel quantile regressions (by year) 
Dependent variable: Total Leverage (LEV) 
Quantile Variable 2009 2011 2013 2015 
5th 
Prof 0.014 -0.178* -0.285 -0.428*** 
Size 0.002 0.012** 0.013*** 0.014***
Growta 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tang 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.185*** 0.141***
Evol 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
Ndts 0.088 -0.099 0.481 0.294
C -0.039 -0.082** -0.099*** -0.090** 
25th 
Prof -0.281** -0.461*** -0.620** -0.722*** 
Size 0.000 0.021** 0.021*** 0.026***
Growta 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Tang 0.329*** 0.282*** 0.269*** 0.282***
Evol 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Ndts 0.404 0.164 0.100 -0.135 
C 0.020 -0.075* -0.060 -0.103* 
50th 
Prof -0.391*** -0.546*** -0.506*** -0.868*** 
Size 0.002 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.039***
Growta 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.000
Tang 0.372*** 0.294*** 0.295*** 0.279***
Evol 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ndts 0.394 0.858 0.229 0.159
C 0.088* -0.094*** -0.093** -0.104* 
75th 
Prof -0.429** -0.578*** -0.829*** -0.781*** 
Size 0.003 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.050***
Growta 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 0.000
Tang 0.339*** 0.272*** 0.244*** 0.260***
Evol 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Ndts 0.978 1.248** 1.102 0.710
C 0.173*** 0.055 0.033 -0.100* 
95th 
Prof -0.678*** -0.731*** -1.117** -1.051*** 
Size 0.006 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.041***
Growta 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Tang 0.229* 0.097 0.150*** 0.062
Evol 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Ndts 0.447 1.733*** 1.154*** 0.462
C 0.386*** 0.272*** 0.246*** 0.233**
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F-test on equality of coefficients 
Prof 7.119*** 4.598** 2.874* 2.711* 
Size 0.247 4.537** 17.779*** 13.064*** 
Growta 0.628 0.495 1.883 0.331 
Tang 5.971*** 6.174*** 2.546* 4.168 
Evol 0.850 7.059*** 3.223* 0.104 
Ndts 0.918 3.030* 1.675 0.358 
N 983 983 983 983 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Table 3 shows the results of simultaneous panel 
regressions on total leverage for selected years from 2009 
to 2015. Compared to QRPD, these estimations reveal that 
the effects of the explanatory variables on the response 
variables tend to vary over time, as well as across quantiles. 
For each year, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 
constant across the distribution is often rejected by F tests. 
Profitability attracts a negative and significant coefficient 
which becomes larger in absolute value over time. Size is 
only significant for the more recent periods, whereas the 
effects of tangibility tend to be positive and significant 
across all time periods. 
Similar results hold for long-term debt, where however 
profitability tends to play a less significant role, and for 
short-term debt. Lagged profitability also tends to exert an 
increasingly important role for the inverse of the interest 
coverage ratio ICR and for the debt-earnings ratio DTE. The 
influence of the share of tangible assets too becomes more 
significant in the more recent period. A strong cyclical effect 
appears to be present in the coefficients on the inverse Z-
scores, with the coefficients for profitability and tangible 
assets increasing during the middle years of the sample for 
the central quantiles and then declining towards the end of 
the sample period. 
<Figure 10> Simultaneous panel quantile regressions (dependent variable=lev; year=2015) 
Figure 10 illustrates the changing values of the 
regressions coefficients for total leverage across quantiles 
of the distribution in 2015, the last year of the sample. In 
particular, the influence of profitability tends to increase in 
absolute value for the top quantiles of the distribution and 
the influence of size tends to increase, whereas tangibility 
displays an inverted U-shaped pattern. 
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The combined results from QRPD and simultaneous 
panel regressions indicate that the assumptions of constant 
coefficients across firms and over time may not be valid for 
Chinese non-financial firms. A number of coefficients 
increase in size over time pointing to increased sensitivity of 
debt ratios to some of their determinants in recent years. 
This can be a potential cause for concern, since a 
deterioration in the variables which act as a restraining 
influence on debt ratios could see even greater increases in 
the leverage of Chinese corporations. 
In particular, the simultaneous panel quantile regressions 
show that the role of profitability in reducing debt levels has 
grown in importance in the more recent period. At the same 
time, non-financial corporations have experienced a decline 
in their profitability in the more recent years. A reason for 
this finding can be traced to the aggressive intervention by 
Chinese policy authorities in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. The significant decline in the lending rate 
since 2008 has reduced the opportunity cost of external 
debt relative to retained earnings as sources of funding, 
thereby increasing firms’ incentive to borrow in preference to 
internal sources of finance. Together with the decline in 
profitability over the same period, the decline in the 
opportunity cost of debt resulted in a heightened sensitivity 
of the firm capital structure to earnings. 
The joint effect of the increased role of profitability for 
leverage and of the decline in profitability itself is thus likely 
to lead to larger debt ratios in the coming years. This result 
is of relevance for the future financial sustainability of 
Chinese firms. It is important to note that this conclusion 
could not have been obtained from an aggregate analysis of 
financial variables nor from a conventional fixed effects 
analysis, since it only emerges from a simultaneous quantile 
analysis where the regression coefficients are allowed to 
change over time. 
4. Conclusions 
Ever since the Chinese government chose to implement a 
large stimulus to support the economy in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2008-09, corporate leverage has 
experienced a steep and sustained increase. The ratios of 
total debt and of credit to GDP have increased at the same 
time as corporate returns and interest coverage ratios have 
been weakening, raising concerns about growing systemic 
vulnerability within the Chinese financial system.   
Based on the analysis of aggregate data, there is no clear 
evidence yet of weakening corporate performance onto the 
Chinese financial sector. To an extent, this reflects the 
predominance of SOEs in the Chinese corporate landscape, 
and authorities’ control over the financial system and its 
major players and institutions. Such a controlled 
environment has the ability to contain or delay the spillover 
of financial distress from the corporate to the financial sector 
for some period of time, but not indefinitely. Ultimately, 
growing systemic pressure constitutes a contingent liability 
to the state, and its realization would come to bear heavily 
on the public budget and debt ratios. 
This paper assessed corporate sector fragility through 
panel regressions that relate leverage and other financial 
indicators to the determinants of capital structure, such as 
companies’ size and profitability. The rationale for quantile 
regression analysis—of which we implement also the panel 
approach developed recently—is that it picks up 
vulnerabilities not just at the mean or median of the 
distribution, but also for the more marginal firms, which are 
those most exposed to negative shocks. Indeed, our 
analysis confirms that the sensitivity of leverage to its 
determinants varies across quantiles, with some areas of 
the distribution being affected much more strongly than 
others. We also find that some of the estimated coefficients 
have increased substantially in absolute size over time.  
In particular, we find that profitability has a restraining 
effect on corporate leverage, the intensity of which has risen 
sharply over recent years. Possibly, this can be explained 
by a significant decline in lending rates in the wake of the 
massive stimulus program, which increased Chinese firms’ 
incentive to borrow instead of relying on retained earnings 
as a source of finance. Against the backdrop of deteriorating 
profitability, this resulted in firms’ heightened sensitivity of 
the capital structure to earnings. Ultimately, this finding 
raises some concern about the recent downward trend in 
corporate firms’ profitability, because it implies that firms 
could react by taking on even larger levels of debt in the 
future. An uptick in corporate profitability in 2016--reflected 
in the latest data release but not in the above analysis--
provides some relief in this regard. 
In sum, the findings in this paper seem to confirm our 
hypothesis that financial sector based on aggregate 
indicators tend to overlook the increased vulnerability of the 
marginal non-financial firms in the Chinese corporate sector. 
The fragility of the system tends to be underestimated as a 
result, and may provide a sense of complacency about the 
stability of the Chinese financial system which is 
unwarranted in view of continuing weakness in the 
corporate system. 
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Appendix : The S&P Capital IQ Database and Regression Variables 

Variable Description Measurement 
LEV Total leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets 
LLEV Long-term leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
SLEV Short-term leverage Ratio of short-term debt to total assets 
ICR Interest Coverage Ratio Ratio of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation, and amortization) to 
interest expense 
DTE Debt-to-Earnings Ratio of total debt to EBITDA 
ZALT Altman’s Z-score The Z-score is a weighted average of five ratios: (i) working capital / total assets;(ii) 
retained earnings / total assets;(iii) earnings before interest and taxes / total assets;(iv) 
the market value of equity/ the book value of total liabilities; and (v) sales / total assets.
PROF Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to total assets 
SIZE Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
GROWTA Growth opportunities Ratio of revenue growth to total assets growth 
TANG Tangibility Ratio of net property, plant, equipment and inventory to total assets 
EVOL Earning volatility Change of operating income (absolute value of first differences) 
NDTS Non-debt tax shields Ratio of depreciation and amortization (EBITDA-EBIT) to total assets 
Note: As of November 2016, the S&P Capital IQ database10 covers more than 45,000 active companies—spanning 130 countries and 
several currencies. It also provides financial statement data for more than 800,000 private companies. Data on fundamentals cover
equities, fixed income, capital structure, credit ratings, transactions, private equity firm profiles, ownership, and business relationships. It is 
accessible with a subscription: https://www.capitaliq.com/ 
For this study, we downloaded data for all private and public firms geographically located in the PRC that are considered operating as of 
September 2016. This includes 36 financial ratios, 24 standardized balance sheet and income statement items, as well as 10 indicators 
specific to banks. The data run from 1990 to 2015 and are expressed in US$ millions, based on the platform’s historical exchange rates.  
For regression analysis, we retained data from 2009 to 2015 only and computed variables as described in the above table. 


10See S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals. http://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/documents/products/SPCIQ_Fundamentals_v2.pdf and The 
S&P Capital IQ® Platform.http://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/documents/products/SPCIQ_Platform_v2.pdf 
